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The RMA Examined 
by Jeremy Black 
Academic strategies vary, and any bi-polar 
approach to them has its flaws, bm there is a 
distinction between the bold advance of the 
revolutionary-style analyst claiming novelty 
and asserting clarity, and the more cautious 
incremental-style analyst, urging complexity 
and being reluctant to provide a clear-cm 
conclusion. That is not the beginning readers 
will expect in a paper of this type, not simply 
because the space available does not allow 
for much complexity, but also because the 
culture of analysis for, of and about the mili-
tary is one of decisiveness. 1 In such a context, 
it is scarcely surprising that past, present and 
future are frequently joined as a display for 
revolutions in military affairs which, once as-
serted, can then be constituted as causative 
forces rh at explain this branch of the historical 
process. 
This paper will adopt a more sceptical 
account, not only toward such revolutions but 
also to the standard theoretical structures and 
devices, and literary tone, of much analytical 
military history. In doing so, it will be argued 
that these revolutions are as much product 
of these structures, devices and tone, as they 
are context-free discussions. In part, miliwry 
revolutions thus share the characteristics also 
seen in smndard concepts and building blocks 
of n1ilitary analysis, such <:lS, first, decisiveness 
and, second, the \XIestern Way of War. 
J. Bln~k, 'Dcrcnninisms and Other !ssucs',]oimld/ of 
Milaary History, riS (1004), pp. 1117-32. 
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Yet, there is also an important difference. 
Decisiveness may be a goal of military policy, 
but it is an adjective of military history. The 
Western Way of War is asserted as a largely 
timeless construct, Victor Davis Hanson in-
deed taking it back as far as the ancient Athe-
nians,' and, as an explanatory device for ca-
pability and success, it lacks a strong sense of 
development through time. 
This may be very misleading, as far as the 
development and usage of allegedly distinctive 
\XIestern char<lcteristics are concerned, but the 
contrast with revolutions in military affairs is 
clear. They focus on change, as both problem 
for analysis and as explanation of effective-
ness and development. The notion of change, 
moreover, is one that is conflict-orientated, in 
that it draws heavily on the Hegelian idea of 
thesis, antithesis, and svnrhesis. This notion 
of change also generally underrates the capa-
city of conservative societies to initiate and 
to execute change, a common flaw in histo-
rical analysis. As a related but separate 
point, the standard approach to change, 
with the focus on transformation, if not re-
volution, ignores the generally incremental 
character of military ch<ll1ge. The last can be 
underlined in the specific case of weaponry 
by noting the importance nor only of initial 
2 V.D. Hanson, Cmwge .md Cultun•: Lmdm<~rk ll,Jttlcs 
in the Rise o{ W'cstcm Poll'£'/' (New York, Duublcday, 
1001 ), and \\1h)• the \Vest bas \\Ion (New York: 
Doublcday, 2002]. 
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development but of the slower processes of 
diffusion, particularly the adoption of new 
methods of usage and alterations in training, 
and doctrine. 
If change is often less abrupt and clear-
cut than the language of revolution might 
suggest, the latter is also misleading because 
it presupposes a clear-cut trajectory in deve-
lopment and, in particular, asserts the prima-
cy of capability over tasking. This emphasis 
on capability is a central problem for much 
military analysis and is related to the pre-
ference for a non-exogenous understanding 
of militarv issues, an understanding that is 
related to~ disinclination to focus on tasking. 
Such a preference can be seen historically, as 
well as with reference to the present world, 
and with respect to the future. In short, there 
is an implicit wish, indeed desire, to believe 
that the key factors in the military world and, 
in particul~r, in the explanation of military 
success are inherent to that world and are not 
external variables over which the military 
have scant control and which are not readily 
explicable in military terms. This is related 
to a profound unwillingness to contextualise 
the subject and to engage with general litera-
tures. 
Examples of that from recent military 
history are, first, the extent to which failure 
in col~mial counter-insurgency struggles was 
largely political and ideological in cause, 
namelv the breakdown of the integrative prac-
tices a;1d ethos of imperialism, rather than the 
result of military defeat; and, secondly, the 
degree to which the Revolution in Military 
Affairs is a response to socio-cultural shifts, 
particularly the abandonment in most states 
of conscription, and the opposition to casu-
alties, both within a context of Western soci-
eties that are more hedonistic, aton1istic, and 
i ndi vid ualistic. ·' 
If the emphasis, in contrast, is on tasking, 
then attention is switched to an analysis of 
military developments as indeterminate, in 
the sense that it is unclear what these tasks 
will be. Indeed, tasks are largely set by cir-
cumstances that are difficult to predict and 
.J. BL1ck, \\/by \\1,rrs H.l/IJICit (London: Reaktinn, 
J 998), pp. 216-38. 
that are not controlled by the military. The 
Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Isles in 
1982, the consequences of the rapid collapse 
of the Soviet Union, the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait, and the 2001 terrorist attacks, all 
come to mind. Furthermore, the difficulty 
of assessing consequences ensures that it is 
hard to establish the success of task-based 
operations and strategies, not least in terms 
of their long-term impact. 
Task-based approaches seem obvious in 
the here-and-now, but, as part of a more ge-
neral process of simplification by posterity, 
recede from attention in the apparently less 
complex past. This approach is seriously mis-
taken, however, and does violence to the com-
plexity of strategic environments and tasks 
in the past. This needs to be taken on board 
in considering the topic of strategic culture, 
which is a key aspect of the current use of 
cultural interpretations.4 
Early-modern military revolution 
It is true that the greater range of possible 
long-distance force-deployment today, which 
stems from developments in communication 
technology, specifically steamships and air-
craft (neither of which in fact were originally 
military in conception), ensures that the situ-
ation in the past was different, but there was 
still the need then to consider prioritisation 
in terms both of enemies and of the most ap-
propriate way to deal with them. Thus, for 
example, Austria in 1717-18 had to decide 
whether to respond to Spanish moves in Italy 
or to follow the opportunities for Balkan 
gains at the expense of the Turks. In the same 
century, there was a more frequent tension in 
British policy between a focus on oceanic and 
colonial goals, a 'blue water' policy, and those 
of Continental interventionism in Europe.1 
Furthermore, there was frequently the issue 
of how best to address internal as opposed to 
external goals. This is an issue that tends to 
be unduly minimised by those who work on 
4 T. Farrdl, Tbe Norms of Wm: Culllmd Beliefs ,md 
ldodc'm Conflict {llouldcr: Lynnc lh:nner, 2005}. 
5 ]. Black, America (JI" Ertn>fld British Foreign Policy, 
1739-63 (London: UCLPrcss, 19'!8). 
American military history, because, over the 
last century, the American regular military 
has not had to focus on domestic enemies 
and tasks. 
These points can be amplified by con-
sidering the issue in a broader historical con-
text. The RMA is at once description, ana-
lysis, prospectus and mission; and much of 
the confusion surrounding the use of the term 
reflects a failure to distinguish between these 
aspects of the situation. As such, the treat-
ment of the RMA is an aspect of the more 
general discussion of revolutions in military 
affairs. Such discussion has a long genesis, 
not least with reference to the contemporary 
European treatment of the impact of firearms. 
Nevertheless, it has become more common 
over the last half-century, in response to the 
success of the concept of an early-modern 
European military revolution advanced by 
Michael Roberts in 1955 when he ''pp lied it 
to the period 1560-1660.'• The success of this 
concept, at least in helping to define debate/ 
ensured that it was then applied to other 
periods, and indeed this matched a scholarly 
interest in transformation and moderni-
sation.s 
This, however, had a so mew hat pro b I em a tic 
character, not least because a questioning 
of the notion of the Roberts' revolution, in 
terms of both content and chronology, coin-
cided with this application.'' The concept of 
an early-modern military revolution lacks 
precision and devotes insufficient attention to 
process. It rests on a 'push' theory of warfare 
which interprets war in terms of the material 
6 
7 
9 
~L RDht:rts, Tlh' MilitdiJ' Rcl'olution, 1 S60-l660 
(!klbst: Qw..:ens Univcr~ity, (956). 
C. Ro~crs (ed.), Th!! Military Rct•ofution l)!'/J,Ite: 
RNdings 011 tht' Milit,11y Trtrusformatiun ol Eilrl)' 
Modtm Europe {Boulder: \\lcstview, 1495); G. Parker, 
'The ",\lilitan' Revolution", 1455-2005: From Belfast 
to lhn:dona ;~nd The Hague', ]oum,tf nl Militdr)' 
/-{i:;tory, 69 (:?.005}, pp. 205-10. 
T. Gongor;l and H. von Rickhof (cds), Tt.m•,Jrds .1 
Rel'oiutimt in Milit<ll)' A/l:Iirs? De/I..•11St' ,md Semrity 
.7! the 1),/ll'll o( tin• Tll'enty-First Century (\\lestpon: 
Ardwn, 2000}; D. Showalter, 'Thinking About 
i\ lilit<lry Revolution', Historintlly Spe"king, 4, no. 4 
(2003), pp. 9-10. 
J. Black, A l\-1ilit,try Rct•olution? Military Change dnd 
European Society, 1550-1 SOO (London: :vtacmillan, 
194 I); D. Parrort, Richdicu 's Army: mzr, Grwcmllu'l1t 
.md S11ciety inl;r,lllcc, 162-1--1642 (Oxford: Oxford 
Univt·rsiry Press, 200 I). 
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culture of war, specifically the weaponry. 
This devotes far too little attention to 'pull' 
factors, in terms of the purposes of military 
capability, use, and related force structures 
and doctrines. Despite efforts to link these to 
the supposed rise of the modern state there 
is scant sign of a fully-fledged revolution in 
these purposes, certainly on land. 10 
Furthermore, the self-conscious character 
of the RMA was not widely matched in the 
early-modern period, while there was also 
then a strong, continued, and, in many res-
pects, new belief in the value of Classical ex-
emplars, and therefore a looking back to the 
ancient world. Indeed, aspects of the work 
on military tactics drew directly on Roman 
examples. Whether or not there is an effective 
modern RMA, as opposed to a discourse to 
that end, that offers no proof of a similar 
situation in the early-modern period. The 
case for a military revolution then remains 
not proven at best and dubious at worst. 
More generally, the definitions of military 
revolution provided in applications of the 
theory so far offered vary greatly, not least 
in terms of duration, content and impact, as 
well as variations in their use between the 
tactical, operational and strategic scales of 
war, and between militarv and non-militarv 
dimensions. This should i~duce caution in rh~ 
use and application of both term and concept, 
but military revolution became like the rise of 
the middle classes: a catchall that was always 
occurring and always incomplete. 
RMA as a product of need 
This introduction could serve as a short back-
ground for a discussion of the current RMA, 
but a longer introduction is necessary for two 
reasons. First, it is appropriare to explain how 
the belief in the RMA in part arises from a 
need that can be explained, and, secondly, in 
order to discern a parallel between the R1'v!A 
of the 1990s and 2000s, and that discussed in 
the aftermath of World War One. The latter 
is of relevance, not only because it provides 
a parallel, but also because it indicates how 
10 J. Black, Eurofl£'<111 \'1/.nj:m•, l..J-().J~lliM) (London: 
Romlcdgc, .2002}. 
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belief in a RJ'v!A was a product of need, as is 
also the case today. 
In the earlier case, the problem was tacti-
cal, operational and strategic in military 
terms - the varied difficulties of winning 
World War One - but also, in a broader 
sense, social, political and cultural, in terms 
of a reaction against the unprecedented loss-
es of that conflict, with all this entailed for 
military rasking. The war had ended in Allied 
victory and, in large part, there was a matter 
of extrapolation from the supposed lessons 
of this victory. This was driven further by 
a determination to ensure that, in any fu-
ture conflict, there was no repetition of the 
warmaking of \X'orld War One, and, in par-
ticular, of its longevity and casualties. 
These goals led to a determination to ar-
gue that the new weaponry of World War 
One, if properly understood and applied 
could be employed to further, ensure, in-
deed constitute, a warmaking that was effec-
tive and decisive. However, as today, this 
entailed the misapplication of tactical and 
operational capabilities and lessons, for ope-
rational and strategic ends respectively, a 
misapplication that readily stems from the 
tendency to take an overly-optimistic view 
of weapon capabilities. Thus, in the 1920s, 
as in the 1990s, there was much interest in 
the apparent potential of air power and mech-
anised warfare. As today, this involved the 
contentious issue of evaluating what had oc-
curred in its most difficult aspect, causal ana-
lysis; and the problem of reconciling theory 
and practice, in the shape of deciding how 
best to integrate the supposed lessons of real 
and contemporary campaigning with doc-
trine. 
Again, as today, there was also the question 
of which war or type of war was likely to 
occur. The range of present possibilities 
may seem extensive- the USA having to pre-
pare to fight China, as well as to persist in 
the 'War on Terror', or to address issues in 
Latin America - but the situation was little 
different for the major imperial powers in 
the ] 920s. It was unclear at the start of that 
decade whether it would be possible to stop 
Soviet expansion short of full-scale war, m 
part because, prior to the battle of Warsaw, 
Soviet strength seemed particularly potent; 
and, thereafter, it was unclear whether there 
would be subversion as a result of pro-Soviet 
activity. States, in the end, did not succumb 
to labour activism in this fashion, but such 
problems had been anticipated, as in the USA 
where War Plan White was designed to tackle 
this threat. 
Secondly, it was unclear how far it would 
be necessary to fight in order to defend im-
perial possessions, and the problems this 
tasking entailed was greatly extended by 
the expansion of these possessions into the 
Middle East as Britain and France made gains 
from the Ottoman Empire. New technology 
could seem an answer to these issues. Aircraft 
seemed a key capability advantage, providing 
both firepower and mobility, and, albeit less 
dramatically, the same case could be made 
for mechanised vehicles. Indeed, aircraft 
were used extensively, not least by the British 
in Iraq." 
The variety of tasks that the military might 
have had to face in the 1920s is a reminder 
that "transformation\ in the shape of new ca-
pability, the dominant theme in accounts of 
revolutions in military affairs, is of limited 
value as an analytical concept unless it is 
understood in interaction with tasking. 
What, for example, was the use of air power 
expected to achieve: overawing opposition 
or control on the ground? It is pertinent to 
remember that this is a two-way process: 
capability can help shape tasking and, indeed, 
affect the assumptions referred to as strategic 
culture, as with the recent return of Western 
forces to Afghanistan. Nevertheless, on the 
whole, it is rasking that sets the terms within 
which capability becomes operative, not on-
ly because of procurement issues, but also 
due to priorities for training and to the very 
decision to embark on conflict. 
The crucial, and related, issues of procure-
11 A. t\Iil!ctt and \Y/. !vlurray (cds), Mi/it,n-y f{{i.•ctit•encss. 
The Interwar Period (Cambridge: CunbriJ~c 
Univcrsirv Press, 1988); H.R. Wimon and D.R. ,Mcts 
(cds}, Th~· Challenge of Clwnge: Militm-y Institutions 
,md New Redlitit:s, 191 S-1941 {Lincoln: UniversitY 
of Nebraska Press, 2000); D. Omissi, Air Pnll'er m~d 
Colow,t/ Cmtrol: the Ro)•dl Air Porcc 1919-1 (J39 
(;'VIanchester: :\lanchester University Press, 1990}. 
ment and prioririsation indicate that, far from 
capability flowing automatically, or semi-
automatically, from new developments, it is 
necessary to understand that, at any one time, 
there is a range of military options available 
for fresh and continuing investment. Indeed, 
the possibility for enhanced capabilities that 
stem from technological developments has 
made this situation more difficult, because 
the range of possibilities has grown at the 
same rime that their real cost has risen. As a 
cause of further difficulty, ar the same rime, 
the possibility of interchangeability among 
weapons and indeed personnel has diminish-
ed as a product of the need for specialisation 
in both weapons specification and training in 
order ro obtain cutting-edge advantage. 
These problems both ensure the need for 
greater claims for proficiency on behalf of 
particular options, in order for them to jus-
tify support, and lead to a related need to 
rank options, whether weapons systems, or-
ganisational models, doctrines, or tactical 
and operational methods. This competition is 
one of the contexts of the Rlv!A: it becomes a 
prospectus thatencourages support~ or, looked 
at more harshly, a key aspect in a bidding 
war, and one where the so-called militury-
indusrrial complex is to be understood not 
as a monolith bur as a sphere of compering 
interests each advancing their case through 
bold claims. This is very much the case with 
the politics of procurement, but this element 
receives insufficient attention. 
Linked to this is the issue of prioririsarion. 
This involves the need to consider the range 
of tasks and how best to respond to this 
variety. Thus, for example, in 1936-37, it 
might seem necessary in Britain to invest in 
tanks in order ro confront the possibility of 
a Continental war with Germany, but, as far 
as the threat environment was concerned for 
Britain, there was also the prospect of naval 
action against Iwly in rhe lvlediterranean and 
against Japan in the Far East. Furthermore, 
there were large-scale present obligations 
in rhe shape of rhe Arab rising in Palestine 
and the Waziristan campaigns on the North-
West Frontier of India. Even if the colonial 
dimension was neglected (and for Britain, 
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France and Italy this was not feasible), there 
were serious choices. Should France focus on 
defence against GermanY, or should it also 
assume Italian antipathy, which challenged 
the maritime routes from France to North 
Africa and Lebanon/Syria? More generally, 
how far should anv interwar revolution 
in military affairs fo~us on offensive or de-
fensive capabilities, and how far were weap-
ons systems suited to one appropriate for the 
other? 12 
Evaluating World War Two from this 
perspective casts further doubt on the idea 
that RMAs are straightforward, either in 
terms of analysis of what is occurring or with 
reference to their consequences. Few prepar-
ed for what was to happen. For example, 
the Germans were not really preparing for 
blitzkrieg and instead learned from their 
successful war of manoeuvre in Poland in 
1939 what could be achieved. Furthermore, 
the tasks the German military were set did 
not arise in a predictable fashion. Thus, <ln 
air force designed essentially for tactical 
purposes was called upon to play a strategic 
role against Britain in 1940-41. 13 
Similarly, pre-war navies sought carriers 
and submarines only as a subordinate part 
of fleets that emphasised battleships, the 
Japanese navy providing a particularly good 
instance. In short, force capabilities were de-
veloped for particular goals and then it was 
discovered that they could be used in orher 
contexts. 
These issues provide a necessary back-
ground for considering the situation after 
1945. In one respect, this involved a consi-
derable measure in continuity, and, therefore, 
no need for a revolution in military affairs. 
The tools for conventional war- aircraft car-
riers, submarines, tanks - were similar, but 
so, even more, were some of the tasks. For 
the Soviets an advance into Western Europe 
would be, in some respects, a similar stage 
to that to Berlin and Vienna in 1945, while, 
for NATO, there was the need, for example, 
12 D.E. Johnsun, h1St Tmrks illld Hc,Jl')' Bomber.-;: 
lmrol'dtion hr the US Army, 1917-19-15 (ftb,rc,I: 
Conrc/1 U11h·crsity Press, ]998). 
13 J. Buckley, Air Pou•cr in the Age of TiJtal \V.:Jr 
(London: UCL Press, 1999). 
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to consider the defence of North Atlantic 
shipping routes against Soviet submarines, 
continuing the large-scale efforts made by 
the British, Canadians, and Americans in 
World War Two. Yet, there were also major 
differences between the strategic situations 
in both conflicts. These ranged from the ca-
pabilities provided by atomic weaponry and 
intercontinental delivery systems, to the need 
for NATO to consider how best to succeed in 
the face of the major conventional superiority 
of its Soviet opponent. 
In some respects, these responses to the 
post-war Soviet threat provided the basis 
for what was subsequently to be termed the 
RMA, as long as the very disparate nature 
of tbe latter is considered. The dominance 
of space is a key issue in modern capability 
and strategy, and this was latent as soon as 
rocketry moved beyond the simplistic guid-
ance systems seen in World War Two. The 
rocker-race from the late 1950s relied, in 
the absence of anti-rocket technology, on 
deterrence or first-strike as a defence. The 
development of anti-rocket rockets, and the 
effective surveillance and detection that such 
interception requires, links the Cold War to 
the present situation, and indeed the future, 
and is a reminder of the pitfalls of assigning 
the RMA solely to the post-Cold War years. 
This is also true of the doctrine of mo-
bile battle and the related weaponry that 
developed from the late 1970s, in response 
both to the Soviet doctrine of deep battle and 
to the need to be able to fight a conventional 
war in Europe. The RMA can therefore be 
seen as an alternative to Armageddon: an at-
tempt (praiseworthy in itself) to create a win-
nable option for non-nuclear or sub-nuclear 
war. The roots of the RMA are therefore late 
Cold War. In particular, from AirLand Battle 
and the Soviet idea of a military-technological 
revolution, thinkers on both sides were think-
ing about ways to change radically the way 
main battles were fought, and so to gain 
an edge, which they interpreted as meaning 
that a revolution was happening (or could 
be ensured) and that, by adjusting to this 
revolution, it was possible to improve their 
position. 14 
That this doctrine and weaponry were to 
be used most prominently in the Iraq Wars 
of 1991 and 2003 creates a post-Cold War 
impression for the timing and tasking of this 
warfare, but the reality, instead, is of the 
application of the Cold War military. This 
is also true, for example, of guided aerial 
munitions, which, in fact, were used from the 
Vietnam War, and of cruise missiles, which 
were deployed in Europe from 1983. 
Thus the RMA, as conventionallv under-
stood, describes in fact the impn;vement, 
or modernisation in terms of technological 
possibilities within a tasking driven by 
competitive pressures, of World War Two/ 
early Cold War systems. In particular, on the 
part of the USA, this entailed a response to the 
enhancement offered by electronics in order 
to confront the scenarios posed by successive 
challenges from the Communist powers, and 
within the context of a willingness, even in 
the 1980s eagerness, to spend the money to 
face the challenge. This indeed was crucial 
to the Reaganite claim to be resolute against 
Communism and to be winning the Cold 
War. 
The resulting capability was shaped by 
commentators into a RMA in the verv dif-
ferent context of post-Cold War pressur~s and 
priorities, in particular the need to provide 
for power projection; as well as the call for 
transformation so as to move from a Cold 
War military to a more varied successor. Both 
put the emphasis on a multi-purpose and joint, 
or integrated, military, while leaving specific 
tasks less clear, the essence of an emphasis 
on capability and power-projection. As a con-
sequence, capabilities seemed key, as both 
means and goal, and thus the Rtv1A could be 
proclaimed as both process and result. 
14 W.A. Owt'n$, '(rearing a U.S. ~:1ilitary Revnlurinn', in 
T. Farrdl ami T. Terriff (cJs:}, The Sources of A-lilitm")' 
Ch.mgc. Culture, Politics, Tcdmology (Bou!Jcr:Lynne 
Ricnncr, 2002), pp. 205-8. 
RMA, technology and the information 
age 
Integral to rhe KMA are a number of con-
cepts each rich in acronyms and jargon. 
The common focus is on smart doctrine: 
operational planning and practice, in order 
to take advantage of a new generation of 
weapons and the possibilities posed by 
advances in information technology. The 
emphasis on precise information as a means , 
as well as a tool, of conflict, relates to its 
use in order to locate forces accuratelv as 
well as to destroy enemy units with s·;mi-
automated weapons. Accurate targeting 
is required if precision weaponry is to be 
effective. This, in turn, entails 'information 
dominance\ in order to deny such a capa-
bility to opponents. The RMA also calls for 
'network-centric warfare': a focus on the 
new capability of information systems, rather 
than on traditional practices and structures 
of command and control. The concept rhus 
linked developments in weapon systems 
with a doctrine that meshed with theories of 
modernization that rest on the adoption of 
technological systems. In the language of the 
RMA, weaponry is designed to ensure what 
are termed dominant manoeuvre, precision 
engagements, full-dimensional protection, fo-
cused logistics, and information warfare. 
Broader requirements were also served 
by this creation of a belief that toral victory 
can be ensured through a specific type of 
High Intensity Conflict. 15 These tasks and 
assumptions can be discussed, without anv 
suggestion of prioritisation~ in tern1s of liben{J 
internationalism, the particular requirements 
of American foreign policy, and the growing 
disjuncture between highly ambitious West-
ern goals and a widespread reluctance to risk 
15 B. Herkmvitz, Tbt: Nt:uo h1ce of \Var: How w:n· 
\\"'ill Be Pought iu the 21" Century (New York: 
Free Press, 200.3); \\1.1\.. (]ark, \\:'inning Modem 
\\"'ars: lr<~r7. Terrorism, ,md the Amaio.m EtttfJil"c 
(New York, Public Affairs, 20()3); N. FrieJman, 
Tern1rism, A/~h,mistan, .tnd Amaic,t';; Neu• W'<~v 
(lf \\"'.rr (Annapolis: Naval lmtirute Press, 2003);. 
D.A. ,\tacgrcgor, Tr.ms{omwtioutmdct· Fire: 
Rcl•olutioni:::ing H.ou• Allleric.t Fights (\X1estport: 
Praegcr, 20031; R.H. Scales, l'cllow Smoke: the Future 
o(Lmd W:~rt:trt.' (or Amt-•ric.t"s Militarv (New York: 
Rmvm.m .111d Litddield, 2003). . 
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casualties. Liberal internationalism became 
part of the new world order that followed 
the collapse of the Soviet Union,'' with the 
argument, fed in particular by the atrocities 
tn Rwanda in 1994 and Bosnia in 1995 
that there was a duty to intervene in orde; 
to prevent humanitarian disasters. Such in-
tervention presupposed success, and relied on 
the notion of a clear capability gap between 
the two sides. Indeed, from the humanitarian 
perspective, the forces of good had to be 
successful in order to avoid the suffering that 
would result from a difficult conquest. This 
concept helped explain the difficulties faced 
by Anglo-American representatives when dis-
cussing Iraqi casualties during and after the 
war of 2003. 
From the perspective of American foreign 
policy, the RMA also explained how policv 
goals could be fulfilled, as this policy rested 
tn part on a military underpinning and in 
particular on how best to forestall' threats. 
The need to be able to respond to more than 
one threat simultaneously, was regarded as 
particularly necessary, and the force multi-
plication apparently offered by the RMA 
was especially important in this context. 
In short, the Rl'v!A made American foreign 
policy possiiJle: it contributed not onlv to 
strategic concerns but also to foreign p;Jiicy 
mterests around the world. Looked at more 
critically, the Riv!A aided in a militarisation 
of this policy in which, furthermore the 
views of allies were of limited signific~nce. 
The ~ame approach could be adopted to the 
policies of Israel, or indeed to the radical 
Islamic opponents of the USA and Israel, 
:"'rh t.he RMA in this case seen as residing 
In vaned combinations of weapons of mass 
destruction and terrorist tactics. 
It is also necessary to consider the extent 
to which the RMA was the necessary product 
of the RAJ'v! (Revolution in Attitudes to the 
Military), in the shape of the greater reluc-
tance to take casualties. This was true both 
in specifics and in generalities. In specific 
tern1s, for example, An1erican concern about 
the impact on morale of having aircrew shot 
16 l. Frecd~1;1n, '!he a~c of liberal wars', Rcl'it:w o/ 
lmcm<Zt/OIIdf5tudies, 31 (2005}, pp.93-l 07. 
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down and taken prisoner in the Vietnam 
War helped encourage an interest in stand-
off weaponry. More generally, the movement 
from mass militaries in the West to smaller 
professional forces made soldiers fewer bur 
more valuable; while civil society as a whole 
became more reluctant to regard casualties 
as acceptable. The two developments were 
linked, albeit different. They each encouraged 
a desire for an RMA to provide apparently 
casualty-low, if nor free, war, a desire that 
was to be challenged by the realities of waging 
counter-insurgency war against opponents in 
part employing the methods of terrorism. 
As, however, with other such revolutions, 
ir is far from clear how far these criteria are 
generally applicable. Indeed, the notion of an 
R1v1A takes on many of the characteristics of 
a paradigm model thar may in fact not be of 
more general applicability. The very cost of 
Transformation in an American context does 
not mean that other powers will not seek 
the same end, but, in doing so, they should 
not necessarily be understood as simply 
lesser-string players in an RMA. Instead, the 
more the latter is understood as, at least in 
pan, task-defined, rather than capability-
determined, the more it will be appropriate 
to note differences between particular pow-
ers. The results will affect doctrine and pro-
curement, and may well mean rhar the RMA 
is understood not as a transforming stage in 
military history but, instead, as a particular 
moment in that of the USA, and of those 
whose concepts are moulded or at least influ-
enced by American models. 
As such, it is the specific circumstances 
and strategic and military cultures of the 
USA that require consideration. Indeed, this 
may mean that, in time, the RMA is treated 
as an aspect of American exceptionalism. 17 
This, like the exceptionalism or sonderweg of 
any other state, is best understood in terms 
of the complex interaction of description 
and discourse; and thus the R1v1A provides 
the opportunity ro advance both. In doing 
so, the notion corresponds ro another tra-
dition of American exceptionalism, its self-
17 A. Lewis, The r\mericdn Culture of n:r.1r (New York: 
Routledge, 2007). 
identification with best practice. This is 
very important to American writers: their 
exceptionalism is borh separate and distinc-
tive, helping to define them and also being 
defined accordingly; but is also linked to an 
interaction with the rest of the world in which 
it is important nor only for the Americans to 
be first and foremost, but also for them to 
be seen in this light. This, however, is a goal 
made more complex by the capabilities and 
practice of power projection. 
The RMA is thus, at the level of discourse, 
an assertion of difference and primacy, 
which matches much historical discussion 
of military development. This assertion of 
difference and primacy would be challenged 
if, at the descriptive level, thanks to a wide-
spread process of Transformation, such prac-
tices became widespread, 18 bur concern and 
response would then combine to produce 
another iteration in which the Americans 
could be first. Throughout the machine age, 
this has been a key aspect of American self-
belief, helping to ensure concern about Soviet 
advances in the Space Race. The ideology of 
mechanization is key both to the modern 
American imagination about force (as seen, 
for example, in science fiction as much as in 
discussion of the military), and to the specific 
belief in the RMA. 
In a machine age, there is a powerful ten-
dency to define worth in terms of machines, 
and they, rather than ideas or beliefs, are used 
to assert superiority over other beliefs, as 
well as over the environment. Furthermore, 
change and the measurement of specifications 
are the inherent characteristics of what can 
be termed machinism: machines are designed 
to serve a purpose in specific terms, can be 
improved, have a limited life (in the sense of 
being at rhe cutting edge of applicability), 
and are intended for replacement in what is 
a continual process of improvement, indeed 
perfectibility. 
This is nor inherently incompatible with 
the notion of improvement as a responsiveness 
to circumstances, but that lacks the cultural 
18 Eg. Re wide dissemination of cruise missiles, L Guy, 
'Competing Visions for the U.S. ivlilicary', Orbis, 48 
(2004), p. 709. 
potency of the notion of continual cutting-
edge perfectibility. Thus, the RMA meets the 
American need to believe in the possibility of 
high-intensity conflict and of total victory, 
with opponents shocked and awed into ac-
cepting defeat, rather than the ambiguous 
and qualified nature of conflict and victory 
in the real world. This certainty is attractive 
not only psychologically but also in response 
to the changing threat-environment. Thus 
the RMA appears to offer a defence against 
the threats posed by the spread of earlier 
technologies, such as long-range n1issiles anJ 
aton1ic warheads, of new ones, such as bacte-
riological warfare, and of whatever may 
follow. 
In short, the RMA is focused on the 
management of risk, a common goal in poli-
cy, but one that is misrepresented when it 
i; presented as entailing the suppression of 
risk. Indeed, preparing to stand for President, 
George W. Bush in September I 999 told an 
audience at the Citadel, a particularly con-
servative military academy, that 'the besr 
way to keep the peace is to redefine war on 
our terms'. Once elected, he declared at the 
Citadel in 2001, The first priority is to speed 
rhe transformation of our military'. 
At the same rime, it is necessary to be 
cautious in suggesting too much coherence 
and consistency in rhe idea of an Rlv!A, a point 
more generally true of other such constructs. 
A less harsh view can be advanced if the RMA 
is presented as a doctrine designed ro meet 
political goals, and thus to shape or encourage 
technological developments and operational 
and tactical suppositions accordingly, rather 
than to allow technological constraints to 
shape doctrine, and rhus risk the danger of 
inhibiting policy. 
If the RMA is seen as a discourse designed 
to win the argument, within and outside 
the military, for investment in a particular 
doctrine and force structure, in short as the 
ideology of Transformation, then, at the 
operational and tactical levels, it can be seen 
as of value provided that a unitary model 
of tasking, that automatically maximises 
this value, is not taken. At both levels, 
there have been important advances in 
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overcoming the problems of command and 
control posed by the large number of units 
operating simultaneously, and in fulfilling 
the opportunities for command and control 
gained by successfully overcoming this chal-
lenge, and thus aggregating sensors, shooters 
and deciders to achieve a precise mass affect 
from dispersed units. 
lt is not new that better communications 
enable more integrated fire support and the 
use of surveillance to permit more accurate 
targeting, and radio provides a key example, 
bur these possibilities have been taken for-
ward by the new technology that attracts 
rhe attention of RMA enthusiasts. The latter 
emphasise the need for speed in order to 
get within opposing decision cycles, which 
are also to be deliberately disorientated and 
disrupted. Again, this is not new, but it has 
been given a central role at the tactical and 
operational levels. The mistake is to assume 
that this has clear strategic results, not least in 
terms of war-winning. Military ourput is not 
the same as military ourcome, a fundamental 
lesson that qualifies the emphasis on 
capabilities. 
Western, especially American, economic 
growth and borrowing capacity, and Ame-
rican resource-allocation have given sub-
stance to triumphalist ideas, because they 
make it easier to afford investment in new 
military systems; or, at least, the development 
of earlier ones. However, uncertainty over 
rasking and outcomes complicates the situ-
ation, although to an extent that is unclear. 
The combination of this uncertainty and 
the variety of national strategic cultures 
certainly ensures that Transformation has 
ro be understood as a number of processes 
designed to meet a number of goals. If the 
RMA ends up meaning this, then it becomes, 
at least to a considerable extent, a truism and 
a platitude, which indeed is the fare of many 
tendencies styled by its advocates (or others) 
as revolurionary. 
The value of the RMA as an analytical tool 
is therefore limited. RMAs are an apparent 
short-cut rhat in practice have only limited 
explicatory capacity. This is particularly so 
because they reify the complexities of change 
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and abstract them from the multiple contexts 
that convey meaning. 
This, however, does not make clear how 
best to consider the nature and cause of 
change. Action-reaction cycles remain the 
besr internal explanation of military change, 
but do not provide much when considering 
the reasons for the use of non-military 
processes; in so far as the distinction be-
tween military and non-military has value. 
These non-miiitary processes can be seen not 
onlv with technology in, for example, the 
impact of steam power on land and sea (rail-
roads and steamships), or the telegraph, or 
with organisational developments, or with 
reference to the general issue of the impact 
of social trends. A modern instance of the 
latter is provided by changing social attitudes 
toward the role of women with the resulting 
consequences in terms of fetnale military 
servtce. 
It is far from clear how best to incorporate 
this perspective. Military capability and acti-
vity are clearly part of the non-military world, 
in which, instructively, there has been debate 
over the value of analvtical concepts such as 
the Industrial Revol~tion, the Agricultural 
Revolution, particularly the first. The key 
phrase here is revolution, namely the sense 
of a seismic turning point in and by industry. 
This has a counterpart in the use of the term 
Military Revolution to describe early-modern 
change, a term that drew much of its potency 
from the Industrial Revolution. However, it 
is less clear that the value or potency extends 
to the concept of revolutions. 
Furthermore, there is the issue of distan-
cing. Just as the twentieth century looks 
different once we are in the twenty-first 
century, so there is the general issue of chro-
nological perspective to consider. From the 
perspective of 1955, early-modern changes 
appeared closer and more pertinent than 
thev do now and a narrative of moderni-
sation could be constructed within which a 
military revolution could find a place. The 
chronological perspective for analysis, how-
ever, constantly shifts. 
This, moreover, is linked to the issue 
of teleology. The narrative, and therefore 
analysis, in the late twentieth century was 
based around the concept of total war and 
the move to that capability. As such, earlier 
history could be organised and significance 
detected. A related narrative was that of do-
minance by the industrial world. 
Now, the former and, in some respects, 
the latter seems far less secure. 19 As a result, 
there is a need to think through a different 
narrative. If revolutions are understood as 
causal discontinuities in this narrative, then 
that may require another set of revolutions; 
although, as already suggested, the use of the 
concept of revolution in this context is ques-
tionable. 
Conclusion 
Shorn of revolutionary language, current is-
sues can be profitably re-examined from the 
perspective not of a revolution in military 
affairs but of a period of major changes in 
military tasking. This reflects the combination 
of the end of the Cold War and the longer-term 
rise in the number of international players 
that followed decolonisation combined with 
the instability of some of the areas from which 
imperial control withdrew, particularly Africa 
and the Middle East."' This rise in the num-
ber of stares reflects the reversal of the role of 
political factors in encouraging the spread of 
Western power. More specifically, political, 
rather than military, factors undermined this 
imperial power, which encourages a focus 
on the role of ideology and belief, in both 
periphery and metropole, in making rule by 
others seem aberrant rather than normative. 
This underlines the contrast in the twentieth 
century between growing technological prow-
ess on the part of the major powers, and the 
more limited role they sought, and success 
they enjoyed, as imperial powers. 
The extent to which new technology, or 
the RMA as conventionally understood, is 
pertinent to this story is limited. However, 
an emphasis on the Third World as an inde-
J 9 J. Bbck, The .A,Rc o/Tot,JI m1r JSti0-1 945 (Wcscporr, 
Pracgcr, .2006}. 
20 J. Black War dlld the New Disorder in the 21 '1 Century 
{London: Continuum, 2004 ). 
pendent source of military developments as 
well as a site for Western intervention, as op-
posed to a focus great-power confrontation, 
leads to a greater emphasis on the variety of 
military trajectories. In some respects, for 
Western powers, this is no different to the 
earlier imperial notion of the military as a 
fire-brigade to deal with crises both at the 
margins of Empire and at imperial centres. 
Thus, in terms of doctrine, there has been 
a revival of earlier concepts, such as 'hearts 
and minds', with related concerns about 
training1 for example in operating in built-up 
areas in the Third World. Technology is an 
adjunct to doctrine, rather than a substitute 
for it, and to this extent again the RMA, as 
usually presented, is of limited relevance. 
Again, however, it is pertinent to note dif-
ferences between countries based on their 
strategic cultures and specific taskings. Thus, 
the British military in Iraq and Afghanistan 
rakes, or seeks to rake, a different position 
towards 'hearts and minds' than its Israeli or 
American counterparts. 
A contrast is also readily apparent be-
tween sea/air power and land capability. 
Superiority in forms of military technology 
and military industrial complexes are more 
important in the former, where their effect is 
fundamental; but precisely the same forms of 
superiority in technology and industry have 
a far smaller impact so far as land power 
goes. A general theoretical conclusion that 
emerges is that factors that help provide a 
capability advantage or cause success (the 
two are not svnonvn1ous) in one context, 
are nor necessarily relevant in others. This 
makes processes, and therefore judgements, 
of causality more difficult. The RMA as an 
ideology, indeed, is in many respects, an air 
power ideology." 
Unpicking the RJ'v!A is not some parlour 
game, but, instead, is crucial to an assessment 
of \Vestern capability. As recent years have 
shown, this is important if appropriate poli-
cies are to be followed. Far from assuming 
that the world is an isotropic surface, made 
knowable, pliable and controllable by new 
21 J. Bhlck, Rethinking Mi/it,rry History {London: 
Ruudcdge, 2004). 
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technology, it is necessary to understand nor 
simply the limitations of the latter, but also the 
limitations of a technology-driven account of 
capability and change. The alternative is the 
illusion that fresh technologies can, and thus 
will, bring new powers and therefore that 
problems can be readilv banished. That is not 
the appropriate milita~y analysis and tasking 
for the twenty-first century. 
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